




Three factors were crucial in the creation of Yugoslavia. First, unification 
of most of the small South Slavic peoples into a single state for the purpose 
of defending themselves against their larger neighbours’ imperialist aspira-
tions. After 1918, for Croats the only serious threat came from Italy. Second, 
the Serbian state sought to expand its territory and influence through unifi-
cation with other South Slavic peoples. Third, the similarity of language and 
culture had often caused conflicts among South Slavs, especially in areas with 
populations which were ethnically and religiously mixed, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the parts of Croatia bordering Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
the creation of a single state was to end. Therefore, the idea of a “Yugoslav” 
state stemmed from the desire for national security, economic progress, and 
stronger and less contentious cultural links among the nations united in a 
multi-national state. However, from the beginning differences in the under-
standing of the political concept of Yugoslavianism were apparent. Like most 
Serbs, Serbian leaders were in favour of a politically unified state with a strong 
central government, where all Serbs would be gathered and dominate, as both 
the most numerous and the most influential nation. But most Slovenians and 
Croatians imagined Yugoslavia as an area where their hard-won national free-
doms and identities would be preserved. The general rule that larger nations 
satisfy their expansionist aspirations at the expense of smaller ones, while 
smaller nations incline toward isolationism repeated itself.1 
Apart from the fact that the founders of Yugoslavia were convinced that it 
was the best solution to the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian issues, the new 
state was also meant to serve the strategic needs of the great powers. However, 
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its founders lacked an original Yugoslav nation, so in order to realize their 
goals, the Yugoslav political elite needed to overcome the deep religious, 
national, cultural, and economic differences among the peoples who made up 
their state. Unlike the West European model of the nation-state, where the 
nation was created after the state, Yugoslavia is a characteristic example of East 
Europe developments, where nations created states, and this difference would 
have decisive effect on later developments.2 
The leading idea among Serbs was to create Yugoslavia to be as central-
ized as possible, with Serbs playing the dominant role in the government and 
the military. The alternative would have been an independent Serbian state 
that would encompass all those areas where the Serb population represent-
ed a majority of the local population, as well as those areas, for which they 
claimed a historical right. Two ideas also dominated Croatian thinking—the 
idea of an independent Croatian state, which would be based on a combina-
tion of national and historical rights, or a sovereign Croatian state with a fed-
eral or confederal Yugoslavia. Slovenians wished to defend themselves from 
Germanic and Italian pretensions. But because of their linguistic distinc-
tiveness and their national homogeneity, they did not share the intense cau-
tiousness of most Croats toward Serbian imperialism, nor did they share the 
Croatian fear of an “amputation” of their territory, because Slovenian territory 
had no areas with a significant Serbian majority, as did Croatia.
Communists believed that they had the idea of absolute good, of a just and 
a sensible social, political, and economic order. They inherited the never-end-
ing attempts of idealists throughout history to build a society on their partic-
ularly ideal principles. They believed that the material prosperity of the man-
kind and the unavoidable clash of classes would lead to the logical victory of 
the working class, either peacefully or more likely by force, which would then, 
led by the Communist Party (Komunistička partija - KP), build a just and 
classless society of equal individuals, free of poverty, exploitation, and irratio-
nal behavior. Communism uses deeply rooted idea that individuals should be 
equal. The idea of equality, especially in poor societies, represented a just dis-
tribution of production, and an end to unfair competition and social stratifi-
cation. The fundamental subject was the people, not the individual; and the 
goal of avoiding social stratification was widely accepted by Communists and 
their supporters. A patriarchal mentality made state socialism possible, and 
state socialism in turn institutionalized the fundamental values of a patriar-
chal society—collectivism, egalitarism, isolation from one’s surroundings, and 
the cult of the leader.3
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As in other communist countries, in Yugoslavia, Communists criticized cap-
italism practice and promoted the advantages of socialism through interpreta-
tion of communist ideology and doctrine.  They dismissed the darker aspects 
of their rule as deviations from the proper, communist course. By avoiding any 
comparisons of communist ideology with capitalist ideology, i.e., the system of 
liberal-democratic values, or of capitalist with communist social realities, they 
were able to use a democratic phraseology to offer a better future.4
During 1930s and 1940s many believed that a Soviet type of socialism 
would be the world’s future. Capitalisms’s image suffered because Communists 
blamed for the economic disaster of 1930s and argued that it had led to the 
rise of militant Nazism and Fascism, and to World War II as well. However, 
Communists did not explain how the Soviet Union had avoided the global 
economic depression, and they were silent regarding Soviet state terror and the 
atrocities and suffering of the population, including massive famines, which 
accompanied collectivization. Apart from the tendency to view the USSR 
as a successful model and capitalism as a failed ideology, in the late 1940s, 
many people were convinced that the consequences of World War II could be 
repaired only through a harmonized action of all segments of society, under 
the leadership of a strong state. In their first public appearances, Communists 
did not mention class struggle or the dictatorship of the proletariat, but only 
the fight against fascism, the struggle for peace, and the need for a thorough 
regeneration of society through an application of the principles of fairness. 
They had no problems in finding widespread support for those ideas.5 
When the Communists assumed power, they immediately began to elim-
inate the market as an intermediary between the producer and the consum-
er. The state took the economy into its hands, and the fast-growing bureaucra-
cy took over the steering wheel. The aim of the Communist economic con-
cept was to reconstruct the country, create an economic base for its rule, estab-
lish the working class as the foundation of socialism, and give priority to heavy 
industry, which would ultimately result in a high employment rate, create the 
basis for development of other industries, and reduce Yugoslavia’s economic 
dependence on other countries, especially capitalist ones. But during the post-
war period, the new regime developed the country to the detriment of the liv-
ing standard through the forced accumulation of surplus of labour, a policy of 
low wages and the intensive use of the labour force, which as the only employ-
er, the state was able to control closely. The consumer’s wishes became large-
ly irrelevant; the state decided where to invest. As a result, investments were 
often made in violation of the rules of economic logic. The nationalized econ-
omy was totally subordinated to the state.  But while the ruthless exploitation 
of workers, raw materials, and sources of energy produced quick results, the 
4 Jerzy Holzer, Komunizam u Europi. Povijest pokreta i sustava vlasti (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 
2002), p. 62; Guide to Eastern Europe. The Changing Face of the Warshaw Pact, ed. Keith Sword 
(London: Times Book, 1990), p. 21.
5 Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After, 2nd ed. (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 213.
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country’s economy became inert. In the end, central planning did not stimu-
late the economy; it simply fostered a lack of initiative and innovation.6 
Communists made use of the occupation and partition of Yugoslavia in 
1941 to promote the revolutionary overthrow of both the old regime and 
the capitalist system. Like in many East European states, they followed sev-
eral “rules” after assuming power. One of their first actions was the collec-
tive punishment of ethnic Germans, who were evicted to Germany, a mass 
expulsion that corresponded to a widespread desire for revenge in Europe as 
a whole. In addition to being the victims of a merciless settling of score with 
those who had collaborated with the defeated forces, under the pretence of 
a fight against fascists and collaborators, the targets of these mass persecu-
tions were also the Communists’ political opponents and owners and entre-
preneurs, who ranged from smallholders and large landowners to artisans and 
industrialists. The Communists organized a People’s Front that encompassed 
women’s, youth, and trade union organizations, all led by communists, and 
some elements of “bourgeois” parties, by replacing the old leadership with 
lower ranking pro-communists officials who were as a rule new and covert 
members of the Communist Party. All social organizations were entrusted 
with so-called “transmission tasks” intended to realize the communist pro-
gramme, with the ostensible aim of achieving the “all-people’s” programme 
of the National Front. Those parties that refused to join the People’s Front or 
challenged the Communist Party’s leading role were destroyed. The People’s 
Front always won the elections, and high election percentages were the result 
of completely undemocratic conditions.7
The Communist Party did not act openly against democracy; it retained 
many significant elements of a civil society, including such institutions and 
forms as a constitution, a parliament, and regular elections.  But it abandoned 
the multi-party parliamentary system with the excuse that parties represent-
ed the interests of defeated classes. Through the use of the political police and 
intensive propaganda by the state-controlled media and school system, the 
party established its control over intellectual life and ensured popular support 
for its one and only electoral list.8 
The dictatoral ruling style of the new regime encouraged idolatry for the 
leader of “the people and the Party”, at the same time it forced religion out 
of public life. In Croatia, especially after the defeat of the “Crusader”’s guer-
rilla resistance in the immediate postwar period and the failure to reestab-
lish the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS - Hrvatska seljačka stranka) as a politi-
cal force, the presence of the Catholic Church posed the greatest threat to the 
communist monopoly on the popular world view, which was an important 
6 Guide to Eastern Europe, p. 21.
7 J. Holzer, Komunizam u Europi, pp. 63-69.
8 Andrzej Paczkowski, Pola stoljeće povijesti Poljske: 1939. – 1989. godine (Zagreb: Profil – 
Srednja Europa, 2001), p. 8; Katarina Spehnjak, “Vlast i javnost u Hrvatskoj 1945.–1952.”, 
Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Zagreb, 32 (2000), no. 3, 507-514., 507.
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basis for totalitarian rule. Communists opposed religion and its bond with the 
people. By a systematic suppression of both religion and national traditions, 
by neglecting their role in creating a strong national sociability, and through 
its ideological monopoly and the suppression of national and religious differ-
ences in the name of the state’s stability, Communists constantly increased the 
frustration of those citizens who wished to express their sense of tradition-
al values. 
In the beginning, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ - Komunistička 
partija Jugoslavije) acted covertly; Communists did not declare themselves 
publicly as Communists.  Instead, they acted on behalf of the People’s Front 
and other “transmission organizations.” The KPJ became more open in 1947, 
and it was fully open after 1948, when it explicitly emphasized its leading role 
in the society. 
The communist authorities pursued a rapid modernization and quickly 
caught up with and overtook the more developed Western capitalist countries, 
as they exploited the country’s natural resources and labor force to build fac-
tories and cities. But despite the positive image the regime enjoyed as a result 
of those successes both in the country and in international circles, over the 
course of decades, the country’s population increasingly realized that social-
ism was a less productive system than those in both Western European coun-
tries and in neighbouring capitalist states, and that the comparison of politi-
cal rights was not advantageous for socialism. The regime sought to show that 
more political rights had been achieved in comparison with the country’s past. 
But it avoided any comparison between Croatia and Yugoslavia with other 
countries, altough they had achieved a similar economic development and this 
proved that Yugoslav system of socialist self-management was no more suc-
cessful than either Western or Eastern block countries. The regime also suf-
fered from a lack of criticism about “today’s reality”, which was typical in all 
communist systems, at the same time that they mocked the previous systems 
of governing and the achievements before  the Communists assumed power. 
Constant presentations of the past in the worst possible light created a beau-
tified but distorted picture of the Yugoslav state and the communist system, 
which fostered such an approach.
Despite their shining promises, Yugoslavia’s Communists did not create 
a society of social justice and equality. Nor did they erase class differences, 
which simply took different forms, and they failed to solve the national issues 
which had troubled the country since its creation. They also failed to sustain a 
level of economic development superior to those achieved by “bourgeois” gov-
ernments in neighboring states. 
Nonetheless, if we ignore the period immediately after the war and the 
activities of Crusaders and remains of other defeated forces, unlike some 
countries in the socialist bloc, in Croatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, there 
was no significant turmoil or unrest, including strikes, which might jeopar-
dize the regime. The only exceptions were in 1971 in Croatia and later events 
in Kosovo. Why this should have been so is not clear. Among the possible 
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explanations were the muted, but fierce repression by the regime in the years 
immediately following the war; Yugoslavia’s distancing from the Soviet-led 
bloc of the East European communist countries after 1948; the introduction 
of workers’ self-management; considerable freedom of movement and of artis-
tic expression; an increase in self-confidence and the feeling of uniqueness 
which was based on a specific place in the world due to self-management and 
the country’s role as a leader of the non-aligned movement. There is no simple 
answer to this question, but it seems that a combination of these various fac-
tors contributed to the appearance of a stable and popular regime.
However, if we compare the programmatic aims of KPJ and the manner of 
their realization, we can see that, between 1945 and 1990, despite their rhet-
oric, Yugoslav Communists were, abandoning their own initial ideas and the 
goals of their struggle in every aspect. One indication that this was the case 
is the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia, even though it also collapsed in 
other European socialist countries. There are sufficient indicators to conclude 
that communism would have collapsed on its own, and that was not a single 
group would fight to preserve it. Nonetheless, the war for the reorganization 
of the Yugoslav state, starting with efforts to realize the Greater Serbian pro-
gramme and continuing through the successful struggle for independence by 
individual republics, was a very bloody one, which demonstrates that substan-
tially different opinions on the issue of Yugoslavia existed among groups with-
in the Communist party.
The Partisan movement’s victory in 1945 was achieved primarily owing to 
the compromise solution to the national issue and the prevalence of the fed-
eralist ideas over the unitary and separatist options. Federalism, at least at the 
beginning, was able to satisfy the minimum aspirations of Yugoslavia’s diverse 
peoples, despite their strong national consciousness. During the first years, it 
served as a lightning-rod for national feelings, but it did not seriously limit the 
powers and jurisdiction of the central administration. However, in the new 
Yugoslavia also, a Yugoslav affiliation - which was then in harmony not only 
with general international ideas, but also with the ideology of the class soli-
darity of workers, peasants and the “decent” intelligentsia - was a more accept-
able orientation than national exclusivity. The suppression of expressions of 
national identity was also more efficient than in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.9
The authorities tried to keep manifestations of national feelings to a bare 
minimum, except for those associated with the official ideology, in order to 
prevent possible national divisions and conflicts. By preventing any substantial 
legitimation of national particularities, the regime sought to build the stron-
gest possible common state. Thus, especially at the beginning, the basic issue 
was the state; the nation was much less important. But in reality, Yugoslavia 
was torn between attempts to respect national differences and a federal orga-
9 Aleksa, đilas, Osporena zemlja. Jugoslavenstvo i revolucija, (Beograd: Književne novine, 
1990), pp. 230-236; Franjo Tuđman, Usudbene povjestice (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 
1995), p. 204.
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nization on one side and efforts to prevent an emphasis on national differ-
ences from jeopardizing the state on the other. For that reason, for most of 
Yugoslavia’s existence those individuals and groups acting to minimize nation-
al differences were looked upon in a better light, often to the detriment of 
national identity, than to those who appealed to and preserved tradition. The 
authorities struck compromises between their desire to eliminate national dif-
ferences for the sake of the long-term stability of the country and their need to 
respect the federal organization of the state in order to satisfy national needs 
and their persecution of those who insisted on expressing their national iden-
tity beyond the specified limits, especially expressions of a traditional or reli-
gious character. In fact, Yugoslavia saw the continuation of collision between 
unitary and national-federalist forces, which became two radically opposed 
poles. Although their representatives spoke openly on rare occasions, except 
in critical situations their struggles were hidden, internecine collisions within 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavija (SKJ – Savez komunista Jugoslavije). 
Generally, they hid behind an arcane and barely understandable political 
vocabulary full of social- and self-management-jargon. However, they con-
trolled the state, and national state-building forces which had programmes to 
turn Yugoslavia’s republics into independent states, primarily among Croats, 
were able to act only in emigration. 
Yugoslavia was a heterogeneous territory, different from other countries in 
the area owing to its different nations, religions, state-related traditions and 
economic differences. The Communist regime managed in part to suppress 
and alleviate these differences after 1945, but Yugoslavia was still brought into 
question during any serious crisis, just as it was before 1941. In the final anal-
ysis, the lack of a common identity was one of most important reasons for 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Those who insisted that the choice was sim-
ple, “either Yugoslavia or chaos,” tacitly acknowledged a basic reality - that 
Yugoslavia could have been kept whole only through the use of force, regardless 
of the form the state took. The creation and disappearance of two Yugoslavias 
were sufficient proof of that. I believe that this would be confirmed by both 
those who supported the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of the means used in their defence, and 
those who wished for their disappearance.10 
Since its creation in 1919, the Yugoslav Communist Party embraced almost 
all the opposing positions take with regard to the national issue. They were 
centralists, unitarists, separatists, federalists and confederalists. The suprana-
tional and integralist orientation among Communists was inherited from the 
“Yugoslav Nationalist Youth”, the tradition of Austro-Marxism in the workers’ 
movement; and the conviction that a genuine communist had to aspire to the 
creation of a classless society, which is only possible under the presumption of 
surmounting national differences in big socialist communities and in a unified 
10 Katarina, Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda. Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945.–
1952., (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), p. 9.
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communist humanity, which was not to have national limitations. The KPJ 
understood its Yugoslavianism in different ways—as opposition to national-
isms of all nations in Yugoslavia, as Yugoslavianism, as patriotism in the strug-
gle against “foreigners” and occupiers, and as Yugoslavianism working toward 
an international order in which “working people” abandoned their national 
affiliation and a common origin was welcome. The fundamental idea was to 
diminish national differences and to bring peoples closer. The Yugoslavianism 
of the dictatorship of King Aleksandar I Karađorđević of 6 January 1929 aimed 
at creating a single Yugoslav nation by eliminating all other national aware-
ness, but the KPJ wanted to create a single Yugoslav national awareness, both 
in the sense of political and ideological loyalty, and in the sense of the mixing 
and merging of cultures, without eliminating the awareness of individual peo-
ples.11 
In fact, the KPJ with its programme was trying to be a Yugoslav cohesive 
force. The federalist stream prevailed in the 1930’s. In the initial phase, that 
was just a tactical subordination of the national issue to long-term revolu-
tionary goals. However, the transformation of the KPJ from a revolutionary 
movement into a bearer of the state order forced it to give more consideration 
to reality. The opposition tactics gradually turned into a state strategy. Those 
Communists who once had denied or dismissed the national issue, became 
representatives of the interests of their republics and their nations. As the only 
ones who had power, they assumed obligations which often resembled those 
of their bourgeois enemies with regard to the republic and national quotas. 
This was particularly obvious after 1974.
Those favouring the whole (Yugoslavia) over the constituent parts (the 
republics and nations) sought to convince the public that the elements linking 
Yugosalvia’s nations (e.g., supranational elements) made Yugoslav, progres-
sive and good, while the national elements forced Yugoslavs apart and thus 
were reactionary and bad. They invoked the humanist principles which valued 
each individual regardless of race, religion and nation, but they defined them 
within the political limitations of the Communist system, all with the aim of 
achieving harmonious relations within the state. However, they never spoke 
openly or questioned the SKJ’s national and federalist policy. Starting in the 
mid 1960s, an emphasis on the importance of the country’s nations and repub-
lics was promoted at the same time that with the importance of Yugoslavia as 
a whole was stressed, but the former gradually took precedence over the latter. 
Indeed, defending national identities and republican interests assumed insti-
tutional forms. With the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia effectively became a 
confederation, and the sovereignty of the republics became stronger than that 
of the federal government. That is why the Constitution met resistance, which 
became stronger after the death of Josip Broz Tito, particularly in Serbia, 
where the constitutional changes were seen as primary causes of the weaken-
ing and disintegration of Yugoslavia. But in the northwestern part of the coun-
11 F. Tuđman, Usudbene povjestice, p. 255; A. đilas, Osporena zemlja. Jugoslavenstvo i revolucija, 
pp. 230, 235, 246.
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try, most Croats and Slovenes saw the Constitution as an attempt to solve the 
profound political and economic crisis in which Yugoslavia found itself during 
the1960s. The position of Yugoslav centralists and Serbian nationalists on that 
Constitution was perhaps best summarized by the General of the Yugoslav 
Army (JNA), Veljko Kadijević.
Firstly, obstructing an efficient functioning of the federal state; and second-
ly, enabling the disintegration of the federal state supported by the federal con-
stitution, at the same time making impossible for the federal state to prevent 
that in a constitutional manner.12
The main problem of the Yugoslav state lay in the fact that the very limita-
tions and achievements of the central government, from the point of view of 
the defence of their long-term national and republic interests were primarily 
defended by Croats and Slovenes. The republics were given the right of veto 
and parity, and they had their own foreign policy portfolios. They even had 
their own armies, the Territorial Defence forces. The Federal Assembly, the 
Government, and the Presidency were the sites where international and inter-
governmental negotiations were held, but the only centralized institutions left 
were the JNA and Josip Broz Tito. In the period of the inflation of conclu-
sions at the federal level, for instance at the SFRJ Presidency, during the late 
1980s, according to the memoirs of its President Raif Dizdarević, most of deci-
sion were not implemented or respected, except for those related to the JNA. 
In effect, only those decisions related to an institution which was beyond the 
control of the republics were implemented. Consensus and parity were expres-
sions of high democratic principles, and they satisfied the needs of nations 
and republics. But at the same time, they enabled the minority to hamstring 
the majority and thus jeopardize the system itself. The longer the deadlock, 
the more the divisions among the republican communist organizations started 
to resemble the divisions among the pre-war “bourgeois” parties.13
In fact, throughout the period between 1945 and 1991, when Croatia’s sta-
tus was determined by a single-party system and the fact that Croatia was a 
part of Yugoslavia, there was a struggle going on between the extreme poles 
of several opposing tendencies: Stalinism – liberalism, unitarianism – feder-
alism, and state administrative economy – partial market economy. Obviosly 
liberalism in communist society must be understood within the boundary of 
the system itself, because Communist liberals never rejected, especially not 
publicly, the leading role of the League of communist. 14
After they had restored Yugoslavia, communists measured their own ideas 
by their influence and impact on national relations. The primary idea was to 
12 Veljko, Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada. Vojska bez države (Beograd: Politika - izdavačka 
delatnost, 1993), p. 65.
13 Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 692; Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel. 
The Desintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd ed. (Bloomington 
Westview Press, Boulder-Oxford: 1996), p. XVI; Raif Dizdarević, Od smrti Tita do smrti 
Jugoslavije. Svjedočenja, (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2000), p. 188.
14 Savka Dabčević Kučar, ’71 hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, 1-2, (Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997), p. 13.
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preserve the state and avoid national tensions. The fierce criticism of inequita-
ble interethnic relations in the period before they assumed power was not just 
a mere phrase nor just the most efficient instrument of the revolution; it also 
bound the Communists to resolve the “national question.” The Communists 
trod two paths to resolve the national question, but both led to the same goal—
to assure national equality and by doing so to present themselves as the gen-
uine representatives of all Yugoslav nations while at the same time they sup-
pressed those national characteristics which tended to divide, rather than con-
nect, nations in a Yugoslav synthesis. Therefore, Slovenes, as one of the origi-
nal pillars of Yugoslavia, like Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Muslims, each 
in their own unique way were allowed their national markers, from language 
and traditions to customs and emblems, but Croats and Serbs could not do 
so freely because as the decisive weights on the scales of interethnic harmo-
ny they became prisoners of that life-saving formula of “bratstvo i jedinstvo”. 
Hence the reaction of the authorities to anything demonstrating Croatian dif-
ferences from Serbs, whether the display of Croatian flags; the singing of patri-
otic songs and the Croatian anthem, unless as part of official state ceremonies; 
the use of the name of the “Croatian language” and the following the Catholic 
tradition. But these prohibitions pained Croats, as they did Serbs, who suf-
fered similar proscriptions. But the pressure was by far the greatest on Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Although all of Yugoslavia’s nations were represented in apex of the Party 
and the State in the numbers corresponding to the national structure, Serbs 
were over represented in the executive branch and in the most sensitive ser-
vices, such as the secret service, the police, the army and the diplomatic corps. 
As in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbs were viewed as “the state-building” 
nation. Due to the federalist organization of the state and the consideration of 
the national issue, as one researcher wittily said, the character of Tito’s regime 
was Croatian, but the state apparatus belonged to Serbs.15 
Although Communist leaders feared not only nationalism and separatism, 
but also dominance by Serb, owing to their numbers, Serbs, especially those 
from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were over represented in the state 
structures at all levels, from the local to the federal. Still, one needs to empha-
size that the national structure was almost fully balanced in the most influen-
tial state and party bodies. The cause of the prevalence of Serbs in Yugoslavia 
did not lie only in their participation in the Partisan movement and their tra-
ditional orientation towards public service, but also in a more positive attitude 
towards Yugoslavia than other nationalities, particularly Croats. Indeed, one 
cannot speak of a special Croatian anti-communist attitude, but rather of an 
anti-Yugoslav one, which was stronger among Croats than among Slovenes or 
Muslims. One should also bear in mind that Croatian nationalism had always 
sought to weaken the centralized system, with the more radical exponents 
favoring the disappearance of Yugoslavia, while Serbian nationalism often hid 
15 Marko Attila Hoare, “The Croatian and Serbian elites in the post-war period”, in: Dijalog 
povjesničara-istoričara, 4, Pečuj, 20. – 22. oktobra 2000., ed. Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, 
Zagreb, 2001, 378-391, 380.
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behind Yugoslav phraseology and rhetoric. Ironically and somewhat paradox-
ically, the Serbian anti-Yugoslav attitude opposed the Yugoslav idea, but not 
the Yugoslav state, which Serbs viewed as an enlarged Serbia.
The idea that the SKJ and the state would disappear with the self-manage-
ment system proved to be utopian, and when in late 1960s the federalist princi-
ple started to be applied more broadly and more consistently, both in the state 
and the SKJ, a phase of rapid disintegration commenced. No other national, 
political or economic forces, apart from the Communists, were there to keep 
Yugoslavia together. Traditional national ideologies took on a new life, some-
times teaming up with the Communist leadership of the republics, and some-
times with the anti-communist intelligentsia.16 
Yugoslavia’s nations, led by Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, looked to them-
selves, their identities, and the creation of their own states as the best and final 
way to realize the national goals. The main cause of the fall of Yugoslavia did 
not lie in economic exploitation or cultural subordination, although many sta-
tistical indicators served as powerful arguments of one or another side, but 
rather in the simple fact that each of the nations aspired to be sovereign within 
a fully independent state. Yugoslavia had been a compromise of various inter-
national and national interests, melded with idealism. 
The history of the communist Yugoslavianism, conceived in a Marxist way, 
is a combination of principled recognition of differences and suppression 
of those differences in political practice, which eventually led to the fall of 
Marxist dialectics in the Yugoslav way and to an unprecedented explosion of 
the old and new nationalisms.17
It is important to emphasize that suppression of differences was to some-
one’s detriment and so caused resistance. Consequently, every effort taken to 
create a common culture and a single language in order to assure the Yugoslav 
state’s survival had the opposite effect because they gave rise to resistance to 
such a state, which sought to assure its own existence at the expense of its con-
stituent parts. Thus, a cybernetic loop was created, in which every effort to 
make the state stronger, simultaneously furthered its disintegration. Yugoslav 
communists did not find a much better solution than those of the regimes 
before them. They used the war and national conflicts to manipulate the 
national issue as the most powerful instrument of the revolution, but by doing 
so they pushed the social issue, the original communist issue, out of the lime-
light. At the same time, they could not resolve the contradiction between the 
need to use the national issue to achieve success for their revolution and make 
the new Yugoslavia stronger on the one side, and on the other, their constant 
fear that stronger nations would contribute to anti-Yugoslav and communist 
revolution, whose basis was almost exclusively national throughout the fifty 
years of the regime.
16 A. đilas, Osporena zemlja. Jugoslavenstvo i revolucija, pp. 230, 261.
17 Srećko M. Džaja, “Bosanska povijesna stvarnost i njezini mitološki odrazi”, in: Historijski 
mitovi na Balkanu, Zbornik radova, (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2003), pp. 39-66, p. 
60.
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Many communists claimed that the problems were in the differences rath-
er than in the nations themselves, and that the differences were distinct only 
because they existed through nations.18 However, the fact remains that the 
solutions to all problems in East Europe in recent history have been sought 
in those states that have given priority to the national issue. Thus, those who 
preferred Croatia to Yugoslavia were at least a bit more convincing than those 
who argued that Yugoslavia was preferable to Austro-Hungary, and  the for-
mer were even more convincing if the measure of success was the minimiza-
tion of national, religious, and cultural differences within a state. 
Any analysis of economic relations within Yugoslavia must examine two 
aspects: the issue of development and the issue of equality. Inefficiency led to 
stagnation. Therefore the underdeveloped were frustrated because they con-
tinued to lag behind the developed republics, and the developed republics 
were frustrated because they continued to lag behind their more developed 
neighbours.19 
It seems that the question of economic stagnation and the exploitation of 
Croatia, and other republics, will never be answered in a satisfactory manner. 
In light of that, the words spoken by V. Bakarić on 17 September 1964 at the 
meeting of the Zagreb Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia 
(SKH - Savez komunista Hrvatske) are very indicative.
We have all started knocking on the Federation’s door with the calculations 
of how much damage we suffered in the last period, and the question is: who 
has even been given anything in Yugoslavia if we were all ‘robbed’?20
Frequently opposing arguments coming from many sides on how one 
republic was exploiting another or even several of them could be, howev-
er absurd that may seem, one of the proofs that the question of exploiting 
and inequality among federal units was an important, but not a crucial issue. 
Although there may be discussions about the application of different meth-
odologies or even the deliberate misuse of data, the fact is that a great many 
researchers, who were often divided by their national or republic affiliation, 
were trying to prove that one republic or nation was stunted in Yugoslavia. 
Arguments that economic relations among republics were inequitable, in turn, 
threw Yugoslavia into doubt and led to calls for its reorganization that resulted 
in completely opposed proposals, which generally could be reduced to a ques-
tion of centralization versus decentralization. In radical versions, that meant 
boiling the federal principle down to a formality, or, in another case, separa-
tion and the independence of Yugoslavia’s republics. Of course, the prevalence 
18 Ivan Perić, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), p. 110.
19 Dejan Jović, “Razlozi za raspad Socijalističke Jugoslavije: kritička analiza postojećih interpre-
tacija”, Reč, časopis za književnost, kulturu i društvena pitanja, 8 (2001) no. 62, p. 93; Neven Borak, 
“Slovenija kot najbolj razviti del Jugoslavije”, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana, 2002, no. 
2., 97-108, 108. 
20 Vladimir Bakarić, Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, 2 (Zagreb: 
Forum – Informator – Komunist – Mladost – Prosveta - Svjetlost, 1983), p. 2.
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of the radical approach depended on many factors, which became stronger in 
the early 1990s when various arguments and proposals called into question 
the survival of the state itself. That is why one should incline to the assertion 
that the cause of the constant crisis in Yugoslavia and of its eventual disinte-
gration lay in the wish for national emancipation and recognition, and that the 
economic reason was a less important element.21
Yugoslavia was created, disappeared, and was recreated as a result of two 
world wars, when regional problems were being solved together with the glob-
al ones. But clearly, Yugoslavia was of marginal importance and always fol-
lowed behind them. Although the cultural and linguistic similarities among 
the South Slavic peoples played a very important role, the defence against 
imperialism of the larger neighbouring countries and nations, as well as the 
strategic need of the world’s imperialist and ideological systems, were the pre-
vailing factors of unifying and maintaining a common state. Recently, neigh-
bouring countries and great powers have refrained from using threats and 
begun to satisfy their needs without the use of force, but rather through the 
manipulation of capital, by promoting democracy, and by promoting respect 
for human rights and the rights of nations. These approaches were quick, con-
vincing, and acceptable for many people. It seems that there is a political will 
of the majority in all parts of the former Yugoslavia, including Croatia, that 
strategic issues should now be solved exclusively through democratic consul-
tation. One should bear in mind that Yugoslavia had been created out of the 
conviction of a small group who believed that it would be a solution to a Serb, 
Croat, and Slovene national questions. After seventy years later of largely non-
democratic regimes, Yugoslavia disintegrated for good because the majority of 
its citizens wanted it to do so and because the “national question,” which had 
troubled Yugoslavia from its birth, could not be resolved in any other man-
ner, not just the Croatian, Slovene, and Serbian, but also the Montenegrin, 
Macedonian, and Muslim (Bosniak).22 
Although many see of the present solution as final, the fact that Slovenia, 
the most western and the most developed successor state to the former 
Yugoslavia, is already a member of the European Union, and that the EU will 
probably encompass all the other former Yugoslav republics, indicates that the 
history of the states and nations in these areas is not yet finished. In the histo-
ry of Croatia’s integration into a supranational community, joining the EU will 
be a completely new experience based on the freely expressed will of its citi-
zens who can finally express their opinion through a multi-party parliamen-
tary system.
Translated by Ida Jurković 
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Kroatien 1945-1991
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel fasst beinahe ein halbes Jahrhundert der kroatischen Geschichte 
zusammen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt sowohl auf der kroatischen politischen Geschichte 
und den kroatisch-serbischen Beziehungen, als auch auf den Beziehungen zwischen 
der Teilrepublik und dem föderativen Staat, d.h. zwischen Kroatien und Jugoslawien. 
Dieser Text basiert sich auf Archivuntersuchungen des Autors, meistens für die Periode 
der vierziger Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts, dann auf publizierte Untersuchungen und auf 
eine große Anzahl historiographischer Werke. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wurde den 
Volkszählungen gewidmet, die als ein Indikator für die nationale Struktur der staatli-
chen Behörden und politischer Organisationen galten, in erster Linie von CK (das 
Zentralkomitee des Bundes der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens) und JNA (Jugoslawische 
Volksarmee). Der Autor hebt auch manche Indikatoren der wirtschaftlichen und kul-
turellen Entwicklung von Kroatien und Jugoslawien hervor und stellt einen Vergleich 
zwischen Kroatien, Jugoslawien und Nachbarländern an. 
